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PERSPECTIVE
The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner
Conferences:
Trade Milestone or Millstone -
Time Will Soon Tell
Leslie Kanuk, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the same time that the Reagan Administration completes the dis-
mantling of the regulatory framework which has controlled the transpor-
tation industry in this country for over a century, the world-wide
maritime community is gearing up for what could prove to be the most
gigantic regulatory superstructure the world has ever known. I refer, of
course, to the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Liner Confer-
ences developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, more commonly known as UNCTAD. The UNCTAD Code
came into force on October 6, 1983, six months after ratification by the
requisite number of countries representing 25 percent of the total volume
* Dr. Leslie Kanuk is Lippert Distinguished Professor of Marketing at Baruch College of the
City University of New York and former Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission. She
served as Chairman of the Advisory Panel on Maritime Trade and Technology for the United States
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, and was a member of the Maritime Transportation Re-
search Board of the National Academy of Sciences.
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of world trade in the year 1974.' The UNCTAD Code is a multilateral
agreement which has the potential of "balkanizing" world trade through
the division of liner conference cargoes between trading partners. 2 It
leaves a small percentage of liner conference cargoes open to third flag
I The Code was adopted in Geneva in April 1974, to become effective six months after ratifica-
tion by at least 24 nations controlling 25% of the world's tonnage. UNCTAD, United Nations
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, vol. II, Final Act
(including the Convention and resolutions) and tonnage requirements Annex I (Art. 49) at 18, U.N.
Doe. TD/CODE/13/Add. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Liner Code]. This was accom-
plished in April 1983, when 58 countries representing 28.6% of the world's liner tonnage (measured
in 1974) had ratified the UNCTAD Code. For a list of signatories see, 22 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1227
(1983).
2 A brief description of the structure of international ocean shipping may serve to clarify some
of the issues provoked by adoption of the UNCTAD Code.
International ocean shipping in most of the world is dominated by shipping cartels, euphemisti-
cally known as shipping conferences. Conferences usually operate on specific trade routes--e.g., in
specific "trades" between two or more nations. Conference members generally agree on rates to be
charged and on levels of service to be offered. To avoid the costly problem of excess cargo space,
many conferences are closed-that is, they restrict their membership and they rationalize their sail-
ings (e.g., they limit the amount of cargo space that each member may provide.) Carriers in a
specific trade that are not members of a conference are called independents or outsiders. A carrier
can belong to a conference in one trade and be an independent in another. Independents generally
charge lower rates than the conferences, and thus exert a downward pull on conference rates, since
conference members cannot let too great a price differential build without losing cargo to the in-
dependents. If a nation permits only conference carriers to operate in its trade, the trade is consid-
ered closed.
To provide a countervailing force to the power of the shipping conferences, many nations per-
mit their shippers to band together into shippers' councils. These councils are permitted to negotiate
rates and services with the conferences on behalf of their members with antitrust immunity.
The United States has adjusted somewhat uneasily to the cartel environment of ocean shipping
while trying to adhere to its basic economic philosophy of free and open competition. In the early
1900s, Congress recognized that United States carriers could not compete with conference members
who had the collective strength to engage in predatory rate wars in order to eliminate outsiders from
their trades. With the enactment of the Shipping Act of 1916, United States carriers were permitted
to join conferences which were specifically approved by a newly created independent regulatory
agency, now called the Federal Maritime Commission. See, Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat.
728 (1916) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
All conference in the United States trades are required to be open-that is, any carrier that
wants to join a conference must be admitted. Subsequent Congresses have reaffirmed the grant of
antitrust immunity to carriers operating within approved agreements in our trades (most recently
with the passage of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706 (Supp. 1984)) but have continued
to deny antitrust immunity to shippers associations.
Carriers can be divided into two categories: liners and tramps. Those that offer common car-
riage services on a regularly scheduled basis on a regular trade route are called liners; those that
operate on an irregular basis according to the availability of cargo are called tramps. Most nations in
the world value the notion of having their own merchant fleets--for economic reasons, for national
defense reasons, and for reasons of national pride. Consequently, many nations provide direct and
indirect subsidies to their national flag carriers in order to keep them financially viable. Such subsi-
dies often take the form of cargo policies which reserve a large part of the nation's cargo for carriers
registered under the national flag and which meet specified minimum requirements of ownership,
operation and manning by citizens of that nation.
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carriers, if agreed to by the national flag carriers in the trade.3
UNCTAD was formed in response to the developing nations dissat-
isfaction with their "have-not" status in relation to the industrialized
world.4 One of the first areas which the UNCTAD secretariat addressed
was the field of liner shipping.5 The developing nations were angered by
the fact that they were barred from membership in the closed European
and Japanese conferences which controlled their trades with these coun-
tries. They felt victimized by conference-imposed rate structures which
they believed to be disproportionately high outbound, thus impairing the
competitive position of their primary products in world markets. They
were concerned that the closed conference system prohibited the devel-
opment of their own merchant fleets, perceived by many nations to be a
symbol of national sovereignty and power. Furthermore, they felt, not
unreasonably perhaps, that they were entitled to carry a significant share
of their own foreign commerce. Their resulting "declaration of free-
dom"-the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences-is a
document which paradoxically supports the very provisions which pro-
voked its inception: closed conferences, increased anticompetitive activ-
ity, and inflationary pricing mechanisms.
A careful examination of the Code itself reveals it to be a poorly
drafted, internally contradictory and ambiguous document-open to va-
rying interpretations of form and substance-which implicitly requires
an elaborately complex regulatory mechanism to assure that its cargo-
sharing provisions are adhered to by Codist signatories. The Code may
also prove to be the proverbial camel's nose under the tent. It purports,
as its title implies, to be a code of conduct for liner conferences. How-
ever, various informed interpretations of the Code, and premature unilat-
eral efforts by some nations to implement the Code,6 indicate that non-
3 The nations at either end of a trade-the importing nation and the exporting nation-are
called trading partners, and a ship registered in either nation that is engaged in that trade is called a
nationalflag carrier. A carrier that is not a national carrier-that is, not registered in either the
exporting or importing nation-is called a cross trader or third flag carrier.
4 UNCTAD was established as a permanent organ of the United Nations General Assembly on
December 30, 1964. G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 1-5, U.N. Doc. A/5815
(1964). One of its principal purposes was to speed the economic development of developing nations.
UNCTAD is comprised of six main committees which deal with specific areas of trade and develop-
ment, including a Committee on Shipping.
5 At its third session in 1972, UNCTAD requested the General Assembly to adopt a code of
conduct for liner conferences. Proceedings of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Third Session, Santiago de Chile, I UNCTAD Annex I.A. (Agenda Item 16) at 93-98, U.N. Doe.
TD/180, Vol. I (1972). This came as a result of several years of effort on the part of LDCs-
originally known as the Group of 77-to exert control over significant shares of their own nation's
maritime cargo. -
6 For example, in 1982 the government of the Phillipines decreed that 40 percent of all liner
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conference carriers might very well be barred from Codist trades, thus
effectively closing the trades as well as the conferences. The developing
countries have also begun lobbying for a code of conduct for bulk trades7
and are seeking the elimination of flags of convenience.' Should they
accomplish these objectives as well, they may very well end up control-
ling world trade, and ultimately destroying it.
In my view, the United States has wisely refrained from ratifying the
UNCTAD Code. I concede that it might have been useful for the State
Department to participate in the final negotiations which produced the
Code, if such participation would have enabled the United States to influ-
ence its outcome. However, the United States did not anticipate that the
Code would actually achieve ratification by the requisite number of na-
tions. Indeed, it was not until 1979, when the European Community
decided to ratify the Code with reservations, that it appeared that the
Code had any chance of passage at all.
The United States totally disavowed the Code from its inception in
1974 because of its clear contradiction with United States economic pol-
icy. However, a number of prominent people from various sectors of our
maritime community-including liner company presidents and union
leaders-have urged the government to ratify the Code. In some cases,
advocates of the Code have not fully understood its provisions, its impli-
cations and its potential impact on United States' international trade. In
other cases, advocates of ratification have not recognized the distinction
between direct bilateral agreements and the multilateral agreement that
is the UNCTAD Code. This paper endeavors to make that distinction
trade was reserved to national flag vessels and 40 percent to the bilateral trading partner. When
combined with an earlier decree reserving all government cargoes for national flag carriers, it turns
out to be more like 60 percent of the trade that is actually reserved for Phillipine flag vessels.
Venezuela has legislation in force reserving 50 percent of all cargo to its national flag vessels.
In June of 1979, the Republic of Korea decreed that 100 percent of all liner cargoes were
reserved for Korean flag vessels.
7 Cargoes can be divided into two categories: general cargo and bulk cargo. Bulk cargoes, such
as coal, wheat, oil or minerals, are cargoes "without measure or count." All other cargo is called
general cargo, which in turn is divided into breakbulk and container cargo.
The UNCTAD Shipping Secretariat is investigating a bulk cargo-sharing code structured along
the lines of the Liner Code, and held meetings concerning a bulk code in late 1982. The United
States government boycotted these meetings.
8 To avoid high taxes and high labor costs associated with flag registry in their own countries,
many shipowners register their vessels in nations which offer them substantial tax advantages as well
as cheap labor options. As a result, nations such as Liberia and Panama have become the registry
havens for so-called flags of convenience. The developing nations believe that if flags of convenience
were abolished, many shipowners operating under these flags could not afford to pay the higher
labor costs of employing their own national seamen, and so would sell their vessels to developing
nations (presumably at a loss).
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clear.9
II. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
The Code is a complex, poorly written, ambiguous, sometimes con-
tradictory document consisting of fifty-four articles and two non-binding
annexes. Article 1 of the Code gives the national shipping lines of two
trading partner the right of conference membership in the trade between
their two nations, and permits cross traders into the conference, if agreed
to by the national flag lines.'" Article 2 reserves dominant and equal
shares of cargo for the national flag carriers, permitting some shares for
cross traders if agreed to by the national flag lines.1 Article 3 grants the
national shipping lines veto power over liner conference actions affecting
the trade of their home country." Articles 4 through 11 deal with the
Code mechanics, including the provision for conference self-policing and
shippers councils, purportedly as counterweights to potential abuses of
conference power. 3 Articles 12 through 17 concern freight rates, tariffs,
and other charges. 4 Articles 18 through 46 relate to the settlement of
disputes and provide for non-binding "international mandatory concilia-
tion."'" Articles 47 through 54 are largely administrative in nature and
concern implementation of the Code.'6
The Code's basic issues and points of disagreement center on closed
conferences, closed trades, cargo sharing, disputes settlement, shipper/
carrier consultation, rate-making and regulation. Underlying all of these
issues is the Code's probable impact on shippers and on trade. The fol-
lowing analysis of the Code's key provisions focuses on each of these
issues in turn.
III. CLOSED CONFERENCES
Under Article 1, Code conferences are open to all national shipping
lines of each trading partner and closed to all others, though third-flag
carriers may be admitted if mutually agreed to by the national flag car-
9 It should be noted that the Code is legally binding only on those nations which have ratified it
and which have enacted conforming domestic legislation. UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1,
(Arts. 47-49) at 17-18.
10 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 1) at 5.
11 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 2) at 5-6.
12 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 3) at 6.
13 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Arts. 4-11) at 7-9.
14 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Arts. 12-17) at 9-11.
15 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Arts. 18-46) at 12-17.
16 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Arts. 47-56) at 17-19.
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rier. 17 Article 3 grants veto power to the national shipping lines, which
can be exercised on "all matters defined in a conference agreement relat-
ing to trade between two countries."18 The veto power gives effective
control of the conferences to the national carriers of either one of the
trading partners.
The Code definition of the term "conference" is so limited and lack-
ing in precision that it is likely to cause future problems. 19 For example,
it fails to specify exactly what constitutes a conference for Code pur-
poses. Indeed, the Code seems to consider the trade between two coun-
tries as equivalent to the scope of a single conference. However, liner
conferences invariably cover more than a single pair of countries.20 Fur-
thermore, several conferences frequently cover a single trade between
two countries.21 Sometimes these are competitive conferences, some-
times they are complementary-operating in opposite directions. The
Code definition of "conference" also does not encompass intermodal
cargo movements,2 2 nor does it provide for membership by non-vessel
operating common carriers. 23 The definition is loose enough to include
joint services, space charter arrangements and consortia.24
This lack of definitional precision creates special problems in estab-
lishing the intent and potential impact of Code provisions. The lack of
clarity extends to the exact content or effect of the legal obligations the
Code creates. For example, the Code requires self-policing, 25 but does
not provide any oversight mechanism to monitor conformance. Further-
17 See supra note 10.
18 See supra note 12.
19 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Ch. I) at 4.
20 For example, the India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylon and Burma Outward Freight Confer-
ence covers trade between all of those countries and the United States Atlantic and Gulf ports.
21 The West Coast of India and Pakistan/USA Conference covers trade to the United States
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts from India and Pakistan, Tuticorin Karachi range inclusive.
22 Intermodalism, or door-to-door cargo transport, was made possible with the development of
container shipping in the late 1950s. Most general cargo today is moved in containers. The con-
tained is a standard-sized tamper-resistant metal box which can be easily interchanged among trans-
portation modes (i.e., from truck to rail to ship) without unloading and reloading the cargo.
23 A non-vessel operating common carrier (NVOCC or NVD) consolidates less-than-con-
tainerload cargoes for small shippers. In effect the NVO buys cargo space "wholesale" and sells it
"retail." NVO's have become an important factor in containerized shipping.
24 In order to reduce fixed costs, several carriers may join together to offer a single service-
either by buying and operating a vessel jointly, or by alternating the use of their vessels. These are
called joint services or consortia. Also, to accommodate more cargo without incurring the costs of
putting an additional vessel into service, one carrier may charter (i.e. space charter) available space
on other carrier's vessel.
25 Self-policing procedures are designed to prevent conference members from cheating each
other or engaging in other malpractices such as operating outside of their approved agreements. In
the United States trades, conferences are required to adopt self-policing procedures; in many other
trades, conferences do so voluntarily.
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more, the Code leaves to the conferences themselves to define what they
consider malpractices to be.
IV. CLOSED TRADES
A careful reading of the Code and observation of unilateral attempts
to implement the Code suggest that the Code is intended to close not
only conference membership but also entire trades.2 6 In fact, the Code is
totally ambiguous about the fate of independent carriers. Article 2.17 of
the Code states that the cargo sharing provisions of the Code concern
"all goods regardless of their origins, their destinations or the use for
which they are intended, with the exception of military equipment for
national defense purposes."'2 7 This suggests that all existing preference
cargoes, with the exception of military equipment for defense purposes,
must be forfeited to the pool. Since the cargo sharing provisions of the
Code are to be governed by the conference, one cannot avoid the infer-
ence that the conferences must cover the entire trade.
As originally proposed, the Code equated conference cargoes with
the total liner trade between two countries. The developing countries
were clearly apprehensive that outside competition might erode the con-
ference system and render the Code ineffective. However, only in the
non-binding resolutions of Annex II is the matter of non-conference car-
riers discussed at all, and then it is with the clear understanding that the
operations of independent shipping lines would be permitted only so long
as their presence did not damage the smooth operation of liner confer-
ences nor jeopardize the Code's cargo sharing provisions. Clearly, the
status of independents under the Code is uncertain. If independent carri-
ers do in fact exert a downward pressure on conference prices, the exclu-
sion of independents from Code trades would eliminate such pressure,
and could lead to monopoly pricing abuses.
V. CARGO SHARING
The issue that has excited most attention and interest in the Code is
the provision for cargo sharing. Article 2 specifies that cargo between
two trading partners should be shared on an equal basis, and that cross
traders, "if any," shall be permitted to acquire a significant part of the
trade, "such as 20 percent."28 This rather ambiguous statement has been
perceived by much of the world as a rigid division of cargoes into a 40/
26 See supra note 6.
27 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 2.17) at 6.
28 See supra note 11.
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40/20 scheme,29 which the fact is that no such mathematical formula has
been proposed. Indeed, it seems likely to this observer that the trade
share accorded to cross traders will probably range well below 20 per-
cent, if it is granted at all.
In the several instances where developing countries have unilaterally
tried to implement the Code prior to ratification, they have sought
greater than a 40 percent cargo share.30 Because of disparities in cargo
values, most cargo-sharing regimens are operationalized through accom-
panying revenue-sharing pools, so that trading partners share revenues in
the same proportions originally allocated to cargo shares. Once a reve-
nue pool is established, individual national flag lines might not be con-
cerned with actually carrying much of their own cargo at all, so long as
they receive their allotted share of the pool revenues. Revenue pools,
almost by definition, provide a built-in incentive for a national flag line to
be an undercarrier and thereby minimize its operational costs, since it is
guaranteed its full revenue share nevertheless. If a carrier systematically
carries more than its allotted share of cargo, but is allowed to keep only
the allotted share of the revenues, you can be quite certain that its share
of conference revenues not only covers its full operating costs, but also
includes a profit. Thus, revenue pooling tends to both inflate conference
shipping rates and downgrade member shipping services.
Aside from allocating cargo shares to qualified national shipping
lines, Article 2 seems to imply that nations have innate "rights" to their
cargo shares, and that these rights may be bartered or sold to the highest
bidder. Thus a developing nation without a fleet may find it financially
attractive to nominate a cross trading carrier as its national flag line in
return for a share of the revenues earned from carrying that nation's pro-
tected pool share. This approach exemplifies the position of many devel-
oping nations which have argued that nations that generate liner cargoes
have the innate right to control the transport of those cargoes. Since the
underlying carrier-the cross trader masquerading as the developing
country's national line-will only enter into such an agreement in order
to earn a profit, clearly its payments to the host country for the right to
carry that nation's cargo will simply be an add-on, contributing to unnec-
essarily high freight rates.
29 A 40/40/20 division of cargo means that 40 percent of the trade is reserved for the national
flag ships of each trading partner, and 20 percent for the ships of third flag countries (e.g., cross
traders).
30 See supra note 6.
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VI. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Code includes a novel, but non-binding procedure for the settle-
ment of disputes between and among carriers, conferences, and shippers.
This procedure, labeled "international mandatory conciliation,, 31 can be
considered mandatory only in the sense that once a party has requested
conciliation, it must go ahead, regardless of the other party's wishes.
Neither party, however, is bound by the conciliator's decision, and the
Code applies no sanctions against a party who rejects the conciliator's
recommendation. When either or both parties disagree and disregard the
conciliation recommendation, each can take the matter to its own na-
tional courts. Of course, the results of domestic legal resolutions to the
dispute may also be in conflict, yet the Code's legal regime only super-
sedes domestic legal decisions if the disputants agree with the concilia-
tor's findings. Clearly, there are severe shortcomings in such an
ambiguous and nonconclusive dispute settlement mechanism.
VII. SHIPPER/CARRIER CONSULTATION
The Code authorizes the formation of shippers' councils to provide
an effective countervailing balance to the power of closed conferences.32
Shippers councils, in theory, have the ability to deny cargo to confer-
ences which do not negotiate in good faith. This threat presumably pro-
vides shippers with the necessary leverage to assure conference
cooperation. However, the threat of cargo denial lacks credibility if there
are no independent carriers in the trade. Without independent carrier
alternatives, shippers in a very literal sense become captive to the
conference.
Another interesting aspect of the consultation procedure is the fact
that the shippers' councils in Codist trades are likely not to be private
sector bodies. Indeed, in many developing countries, existing shippers'
councils are quasi-governmental organizations designed to prohibit con-
ference exploitation. Given the fact that the Code does not expressly
require a shippers' organization to be a private sector body, it seems
likely that the shippers' councils of many developing countries will be
government sponsored groups organized to negotiate rates and condi-
tions of service with the liner conferences. If the national shipping line is
also government owned or sponsored, the shipper and carrier bargaining
agents of the developing country might have too much of a unanimity of
interests for true bargaining to take place. Thus, the Code's supposed
31 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Arts. 23-46) at 12-17.
32 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 11) at 8-9.
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process of commercial negotiation between shippers and carriers may in
reality lead to unilateral rate regulation by the developing nations.
Consider the fact that the Code guarantees the national flag lines of
the developing countries membership in their liner conferences, gives
them veto power over all conference actions, and permits their govern-
ments-through government-controlled shippers' councils-to be the of-
ficial negotiators with the conferences on rates and services. Under such
a scenario, both the shippers and the carriers of the developed trading
partner are in a very tenuous position in terms of striking a fair and
equitable deal.
VIII. RATE SETTING
The Code gives the developing countries effective control over con-
ference rate-setting through outright government regulation, mandatory
negotiation with government-sponsored shippers' councils, and through
"guidance" to conference rate-making bodies via the national flag line's
participation in the conference. In a Codist trade, rates can be expected
to increase: first, because of the inefficiencies of operation inherent in the
captive trade, and second, because of the peculiar requirement that limits
the minimum time interval between general freight rate increases to fif-
teen months.33 While it is likely that the drafters of this provision in-
tended that the restriction on increasing rates more frequently than once
every fifteen months would keep rates down, it is even more likely to
have the opposite effect. As commercial entities, carriers can be expected
to adopt risk avoidance strategies in their rate-making procedures which
provide them with buffers against unexpected downturns in business or
increased operating costs. Risk avoidance strategies would dictate that
rates be set at much higher levels than necessary in order to cover unex-
pected contingencies that may arise during the fifteen month interval be-
tween permitted rate increases.
The Code has another interesting rate provision: it permits the de-
veloping nations to insist on special promotional freight rates for exports
they wish to promote.34 Such special rates will have to be cross-subsi-
dized, either by other export commodities or, which is more likely, by
imports.35 Thus, the burden of cross-subsidizing selected promotional
33 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 14) at 9-10.
34 UNCTAD Liner Code, supra note 1, (Art. 15) at 10.
35 Rates are set on the basis of roundtrip voyages. If some rates are noncompensatory (i.e.,
"promotional") other rates must be increased accordingly. Since the developing country is not likely
to permit an increase in the CIF costs of any other of its export commodities because that would
make them uncompetitive in world markets, it will no doubt look to an increase in inbound rates for
noncritical items, particularly those for which there are more than one source.
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exports is likely to fall on the developed trading partner's own exports,
making them less competitive in the marketplace.
The problem with excessive rates is that they tend to restrict trade.
The ultimate result, of course, is not only reduced trade, but reduced
revenues. This can have a downward spiralling effect on the economies
of both the developed and the developing trading partners, with the po-
tential consequence that UNCTAD will demand ever greater concessions
for the developing countries.
IX. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
For years the international shipping community has decried what it
has perceived to be excessive regulation in the United States trades. I'm
afraid that they have not seen anything yet. While the Code goes under
the guise of an international agreement governed by commercial negotia-
tions between shippers and carriers, it will require an inordinate amount
of government regulation to ensure that the specified share of every sig-
natory nation's trade with every other signatory nation is carried on the
nominated carrier, and that the resulting revenues are divided according
to formula. With a totally bilateralized world trade, the mechanism re-
quired for keeping track of cargo and revenue shares on a nation-by-
nation basis promises to create an incredible new lawyer of government
bureaucracy across the maritime world. It is somewhat ironic that this
should occur at approximately the same time that the United States has
sharply reduced all transportation regulation.36
X. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The closed conference provision of the Code appears to offer the
potential for greater operating efficiencies through the rationalization of
cargoes, leading to high vessel utilization and reduced unit costs. 37 How-
ever, a number of inherent factors in the Code lead me to believe that
inefficiencies will prevail instead, leading to higher rates for most ship-
pers and deliberately lower rates for others. First, the rigid cargo sharing
formula has no built-in rewards for carrier efficiency, such as a redistri-
bution of pool shares. Thus, with a captive market, carriers are unlikely
36 Passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 completed deregulation of all the transportation modes:
air, motor carrier, rail and ocean carriage. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, §§ 1-22, 98
Stat. 67-70, 72-77, 80-90 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1984)).
37 Because of the high break-even costs of container vessels, high utilization permits the alloca-
tion of fixed costs across a greater number of containers, thus reducing the cost per container. Low
utilization (i.e., over-tonnaging) requires that fixed costs be spread over fewer containers, thus in-
creasing the unit cost.
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to expend time or money to improve service or equipment or seek ways
to reduce costs. Second, since conferences generally set their rates at a
level high enough to yield a profit for their least efficient member, more
efficient carriers in the conference tend to earn excess profits at the con-
ference-set rates. These excess profits are somewhat tempered by the
presence of independent competition in the trade, which, as suggested
earlier, serves to exert a downward pull on conference rates. If Codist
traders are closed to independent carrier, however, an important curb on
monopoly profits will have been lost, and rates in general can be expected
to escalate.
In sum, the Code can be expected to fragment world trade, eliminate
or minimize independent competition, apportion cargo without regard
for relative differences in commercial efficiency, and eliminate conference
flexibility. Furthermore, due to their relative inexperience in the field of
ocean transportation, it is likely that the shipping lines of the developing
nations will operate at higher costs and with lower service levels than the
established cross traders which they will replace. This, together with the
conference system's natural tendency to protect members with relatively
high costs, supports the conclusion that the shipper is likely to experience
much higher transportation costs and substantially decreased service in a
fully operating code environment.
XI. UNITED STATES OPTIONS
In addition to all of the potential problems listed above, an even
bigger problem that might emerge if the United States were to ratify the
Code is the loss of United States control over the terms of its own trade.
In a forum where the majority rules, the developing nations have the
advantage of numbers. Despite their lack of economic strength, their
efforts to reorder world economic relations may very well be accom-
plished simply through their superiority of numbers. Given the example
of recent actions in the United Nations, I for one fear the prospect of
having majority treaty decisions affecting United States world commerce
made by majority vote of other nations, who may not have the best inter-
ests of this nation at heart.
The primary attraction of the Code among United States maritime
interests is its cargo sharing provision. However, a careful reading of the
Code suggests that United States carriers would have to relinquish their
hold on all government-reserved cargoes38 other than military equipment
38 At the present time, the United States has a cargo policy which requires that 50 percent of all
government-implied cargoes (e.g. AID cargoes) move on United States flag vessels. 46 U.S.C.
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for national defense; thus, the effective increase in their share of guaran-
teed cargo would not be as significant as they may have envisioned. If
cargo sharing is indeed the objective, there appear to be better ways to
accomplish it-ways that would not require the United States to
subordinate its own best interests to a multinational treaty. But before I
discuss other United States policy options, it may be useful to examine
the nature of the European Community's reservations to the UNCTAD
Code-the so-called Brussels package.
XII. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (E.C.) RESERVATIONS
The E.C. reservations, in brief, disapply the cargo sharing provisions
of the Code to trade among the O.E.C.D. nations. This effectively elimi-
nates any benefits whatever to United States flag carriers if the United
States joins in the Code's ratification with the same reservations as the
Brussels package. Consider how United States participation in world
trade would be effected under three possible trade scenarios: trade be-
tween the United States and another O.E.C.D. nation; trade between the
United States and a developing country; and trade between two develop-
ing countries with United States carriers operating as cross traders. For
the sake of this example, let us assume a 40/40/20 cargo division (that is,
40 percent of the trade to the flag vessels of each trading partner, and 20
percent reserved for cross traders.)
In the first scenario, the cargo sharing provision would simply not
apply, so that in our trade with Europe, for example, where the United
States currently carries far less than 40 percent, United States ships
would receive no added benefit through cargo reservation. In the second
scenario, where the United States trades with a developing country, our
trading partner could claim the full 40 percent of its cargo
share; however, the United States share, together with the 20 percent
third flag share, would be open to competition by all O.E.C.D. countries.
Again, United States carriers would receive no added benefits of cargo
reservation, while the O.E.C.D. carriers presently in the trade would not
be required to relinquish any cargoes to United States carriers. In the
third scenario, where United States carriers operate as cross traders in a
trade between two developing countries, each trading partner would re-
tain 40 percent of the total trade, while the United States carriers would
have to compete with all other cross traders for a price of the remaining
20 percent share. Thus, under none of the possible scenarios would
United States carriers receive any added cargo benefits were the govern-
§ 1241(b)(1) (1982). Under the Code, such cargo will no longer be reserved for United States ves-
sels, but will go into the common pool.
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ment to ratify the UNCTAD Code with the E.C. reservations, as so
many of our European colleagues have urged us to do.3 9
Clearly, the United States has nothing to gain if it were to ratify the
Code with the same reservations as the E.C. Why, then, do our Euro-
pean trading partners urge us to adopt it? They have made no secret of
the fact that they are trying to head the United States off from taking
what this observer considers to be a more logical course of action to
achieve the same cargo sharing benefits: the negotiation of selected bi-
lateral treaties. Government-to-government bilateral treaties would
guarantee United States carriers a specific share of United States interna-
tional commerce, and by doing so, would effectively limit the amount of
United States cargo available to the European Community through di-
rect and cross trading.
XIII. BILATERAL TREATIES
If we were living in a more perfect world, I would be totally opposed
to the notion of the United States negotiating bilateral treaties with its
trading partners. In fact, during my tenure on the Federal Maritime
Commission, I consistently voted against bilateral agreements. My views
towards bilaterals-towards any sort of protectionism-have not
changed. I believe that bilateral agreements tend to inhibit trade, that
they harm rather than help shippers, and that they are costly to the ulti-
mate consumer. The same problems and potential for abuse which I
identified in terms of the cargo sharing provision of the UNCTAD Code
are present in government-to-government cargo sharing schemes.
Why then do I support bilaterals? The answer is simple. We are not
living in a perfect world. Events are overtaking us. The UNCTAD
Code has already gone into effect, though its impact has so far been mini-
mal because the signatory nations must draft the necessary domestic leg-
islation to properly implement the Code. Protectionism, with all its
implied and potential abuses, is rampant throughout the maritime world.
Under these circumstances, I feel that the United States-as the largest
contributor to world commerce-must actively adopt a regime over
which it can exert and maintain significant control. We must not allow
ourselves to become pawns in a Codist world through a policy of passive
or even benign acceptance. We must do what is best for this nation-
actively, aggressively, and soon. And I am convinced that it is in the best
interests of this nation to have a strong merchant marine.
39 The Consultative Shipping Group (CSG), made up of members of the European Community
and Japan, has held a series of meetings with State Department officials urging the United States to
ratify the Code.
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A series of carefully drafted bilateral treaties will give the United
States the guaranteed cargo base needed to strengthen its merchant
marine. Such treaties will permit the United States to negotiate from a
position of strength and to have a full and equal say in their provisions.
In my view, a major problem with the bilateral treaties we presently
have4 is that our negotiators allowed them to be too vague and ambigu-
ous. They agreed to a broad-brush framework, to be filled in later
through commercial negotiation. However, I suspect that the subsequent
so-called "commercial" negotiations were strongly influenced by our
trading partners' interests, with the result that these treaties tend to favor
the carriers of our trading partners more than they do our own. It is
ironic that United States carriers have been so grateful to receive a guar-
anteed share of these trades, that they have willingly accepted such ineq-
uities without complaint. Hopefully, future bilateral treaties will be
negotiated from a position of strength, to assure that United States flag
carriers enjoy at least equivalent benefits as do other carriers in the same
trades.
XIV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I would like to underscore my belief that guaranteed
cargo shares tend to inhibit a carrier's service incentives, to the ultimate
detriment of shippers and the general public. A protected industry has
little motivation to innovate, to reduce costs, or to improve service. In-
deed, major shippers have reported that the worst carrier service they
receive are in the very trades which are presently covered by bilateral
regimes.
An alternative to ratifying the UNCTAD Code of Conduct of Liner
Conferences is the promulgation by the United States of a network of
bilateral treaties. However, if the United States does enter into bilateral
cargo-sharing treaties, it must exert special effort to assure that United
States shippers are not hurt in the process. As a quid-pro-quo for their
guaranteed cargo shares, United States carriers must pledge to render
quality service at rates which enable United States shippers to remain
competitive with foreign exporters. United States carriers must actively
44 The United States presently has two 40/40/20 bilateral treaties: one with Argentina (Memo
of Understanding/Maritime Matters, Mar. 31, 1978, United States-Argentina, 30 U.S.T. 1054,
T.I.A.S. No. 9239.) and the other with Brazil (Agreement on Shipping: Equal Access to Govern-
ment-Controlled Cargoes, Nov. 17, 1977, United States-Brazil, 29 U.S.T. 2860, T.I.A.S. No. 8981;
Extension of Nov. 17, 1977 Agreement, Oct. 26, 1983, United States-Brazil, T.I.A.S. No. 10802).
However, as a result of a side agreement between Argentina and Brazil, each country has allotted
approximately half of the 20 percent third flag share to the other; thus the effective division is really
closer to 40/50/10 in each bilateral trade.
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strive not to take United States shippers for granted, but should con-
stantly seek to anticipate and to satisfy their commercial needs.
In an increasingly ethnocentric world, United States carriers must
recognize that United States shippers are their partners in world trade.
In this regard, they can take a cue from some of our trading partners. If
the United States is to prosper as a nation, all parties must work together
to help each other achieve both individual and mutual objectives-not
least of which should be a stronger United States based on increased in-
ternational trade.
